Close Open Privacy Scan
App Privacy Score
Low risk · 54 finding(s)
Based on: 1 first-party package(s) · 5/5 deps analyzed
Dependency score: 67 (Medium risk)
bar_chart Score Breakdown
list Scan Summary
swap_horiz Application data flows
No application data flows were found. See dependency data flows below.
hub Dependency data flows (1)
- 1source
pkgs/npm/[email protected]/lib/adapters/http.js:861 - 2sink
pkgs/npm/[email protected]/lib/adapters/http.js:1062
</> First-Party Code
first-party (npm)
npm first-partyexpand_more 11 low-confidence finding(s)
low env_fs — Environment-variable access. 9 locations
low egress — Outbound request to a variable or assembled URL on a network client. Review what data is sent to this destination. 2 locations
</> Dependencies
axios
npm dependency req = transport.request(options, function handleResponse(res) {
clearConnectPhaseTimer();
if (req.destroyed) return;
const streams = [res];
const responseLength = utils.toFiniteNumber(res.headers['content-length']);
if (onDownloadProgress || maxDownloadRate) {
const transformStream = new AxiosTransformStream({
maxRate: utils.toFiniteNumber(maxDownloadRate),
});
onDownloadProgress &&
transformStream.on(
'progress',
flushOnFinish(
transformStream,
progressEventDecorator(
responseLength,
progressEventReducer(asyncDecorator(onDownloadProgress), true, 3)
)
)
);
streams.push(transformStream);
}
// decompress the response body transparently if required
let responseStream = res;
// return the last request in case of redirects
const lastRequest = res.req || req;
// if decompress disabled we should not decompress
if (decompress !== false && res.headers['content-encoding']) {
// if no content, but headers still say that it is encoded,
// remove the header not confuse downstream operations
if (method === 'HEAD' || res.statusCode === 204) {
delete res.headers['content-encoding'];
}
switch ((res.headers['content-encoding'] || '').toLowerCase()) {
/*eslint default-case:0*/
case 'gzip':
case 'x-gzip':
case 'compress':
case 'x-compress':
// add the unzipper to the body stream processing pipeline
streams.push(zlib.createUnzip(zlibOptions));
// remove the content-encoding in order to not confuse downstream operations
delete res.headers['content-encoding'];
break;
case 'deflate':
streams.push(new ZlibHeaderTransformStream());
// add the unzipper to the body stream processing pipeline
streams.push(zlib.createUnzip(zlibOptions));
// remove the content-encoding in order to not confuse downstream operations
delete res.headers['content-encoding'];
break;
case 'br':
if (isBrotliSupported) {
streams.push(zlib.createBrotliDecompress(brotliOptions));
delete res.headers['content-encoding'];
}
break;
case 'zstd':
if (isZstdSupported) {
streams.push(zlib.createZstdDecompress(zstdOptions));
delete res.headers['content-encoding'];
}
break;
}
}
responseStream = streams.length > 1 ? stream.pipeline(streams, utils.noop) : streams[0];
const response = {
status: res.statusCode,
statusText: res.statusMessage,
headers: new AxiosHeaders(res.headers),
config,
request: lastRequest,
};
if (responseType === 'stream') {
// Enforce maxContentLength on streamed responses; previously this
// was applied only to buffered responses.
if (maxContentLength > -1) {
const limit = maxContentLength;
const source = responseStream;
async function* enforceMaxContentLength() {
let totalResponseBytes = 0;
for await (const chunk of source) {
totalResponseBytes += chunk.length;
if (totalResponseBytes > limit) {
throw new AxiosError(
'maxContentLength size of ' + limit + ' exceeded',
AxiosError.ERR_BAD_RESPONSE,
config,
lastRequest
);
}
yield chunk;
}
}
responseStream = stream.Readable.from(enforceMaxContentLength(), {
objectMode: false,
});
}
response.data = responseStream;
settle(resolve, reject, response);
} else {
const responseBuffer = [];
let totalResponseBytes = 0;
responseStream.on('data', function handleStreamData(chunk) {
responseBuffer.push(chunk);
totalResponseBytes += chunk.length;
// make sure the content length is not over the maxContentLength if specified
if (maxContentLength > -1 && totalResponseBytes > maxContentLength) {
// stream.destroy() emit aborted event before calling reject() on Node.js v16
rejected = true;
responseStream.destroy();
abort(
new AxiosError(
'maxContentLength size of ' + maxContentLength + ' exceeded',
AxiosError.ERR_BAD_RESPONSE,
config,
lastRequest
)
);
}
});
responseStream.on('aborted', function handlerStreamAborted() {
if (rejected) {
return;
}
const err = new AxiosError(
'stream has been aborted',
AxiosError.ERR_BAD_RESPONSE,
config,
lastRequest,
response
);
responseStream.destroy(err);
reject(err);
});
responseStream.on('error', function handleStreamError(err) {
if (rejected) return;
reject(AxiosError.from(err, null, config, lastRequest, response));
});
responseStream.on('end', function handleStreamEnd() {
try {
let responseData =
responseBuffer.length === 1 ? responseBuffer[0] : Buffer.concat(responseBuffer);
if (responseType !== 'arraybuffer') {
responseData = responseData.toString(responseEncoding);
if (!responseEncoding || responseEncoding === 'utf8') {
responseData = utils.stripBOM(responseData);
}
}
response.data = responseData;
} catch (err) {
return reject(AxiosError.from(err, null, config, response.request, response));
}
settle(resolve, reject, response);
});
}
abortEmitter.once('abort', (err) => {
if (!responseStream.destroyed) {
responseStream.emit('error', err);
responseStream.destroy();
}
});
});
A credential (read from the environment/filesystem, or parsed from the request URL) is applied as authorization on the same outbound request. This is intentional authentication to the service the credential belongs to, not unexpected data exfiltration.
Fix: Confirm the destination is the credential's own service; scope the credential and avoid logging it. No action if this is the intended authenticated API call.
expand_more 3 low-confidence finding(s)
low egress — Outbound request to a variable or assembled URL on a network client. Review what data is sent to this destination. 2 locations
const noProxy = (process.env.no_proxy || process.env.NO_PROXY || '').toLowerCase();
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk
npm dependencyexpand_more 38 low-confidence finding(s)
low egress — Outbound request to a variable or assembled URL on a network client. Review what data is sent to this destination. 22 locations
const response = await fetch(url);
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
writeFileSync(outputPath, fullContent, 'utf-8');
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
low env_fs — Environment-variable access. 14 locations
express
npm dependencyexpand_more 1 low-confidence finding(s)
var env = process.env.NODE_ENV || 'development';
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.