Close Open Privacy Scan
App Privacy Score
Low risk · 233 finding(s)
Dependency score: 82 (Low risk)
bar_chart Score Breakdown
list Scan Summary
swap_horiz External domains
687fb701029421ae5549d998--8000.hf.jobsapi-inference.huggingface.coapi.cerebras.aiapi.cohere.comapi.deepinfra.comapi.endpoints.huggingface.cloudapi.featherless.aiapi.fireworks.aiapi.github.comapi.groq.comapi.novita.aiapi.openai.comapi.publicai.coapi.replicate.comapi.scaleway.aiapi.slack.comapi.telegram.orgapi.together.xyzapi.wavespeed.aiapi.z.aiarxiv.orgcdn.britannica.comconsoledonottrack.comcoqui.aicore.telegram.orgdatasets-server.huggingface.codeveloper.mozilla.orgdiscord.comdiscordpy.readthedocs.iodocs.github.comdocs.microsoft.comdocs.python.orgendpoints.huggingface.cofal.runfate.ffmpeg.orgffmpeg.orgfilesystem-spec.readthedocs.ioformulae.brew.shgit-scm.comgithub.comhf.cohub-ci.huggingface.cohub.my-company.comhuggingface.coinference.api.nscale.comipywidgets.readthedocs.iojson-schema.orgjzgu0buei5.us-east-1.aws.endpoints.huggingface.cloudkeras.iomy-text-to-image.region.vendor.endpoints.huggingface.cloudndjson.orgnew-url.comnew.webhook.siteoai.endpoints.kepler.ai.cloud.ovh.netopennmt.netplatform.openai.compyav.orgpypi.orgpytorch.orgqueue.fal.runraw.githubusercontent.comrequests.readthedocs.iorouter.huggingface.costackoverflow.comtldp.orgtqdm.github.ioupload.wikimedia.orgwebhook.sitewww.brynosaurus.comwww.ffmpeg.orgwww.google.comwww.ietf.orgwww.python-httpx.orgwww.scivision.devwww.w3.org
</> First-Party Code
first-party (python)
python first-partyexpand_more 6 low-confidence finding(s)
with open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "normalizer.json"), "r") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "normalizer.json"), "r") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(config_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(readme_path, encoding="utf-8") as readme_file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(version_path, encoding="utf-8") as fp:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as requirements:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
</> Dependencies
av
python dependencyexpand_more 10 low-confidence finding(s)
yield os.environ["PYAV_TESTDATA_DIR"]
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = urlopen(url)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(tmp_path, "wb") as fh:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(filepath, "w", options={"update": "1"}) as output:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open("../av/about.py") as fp:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HW_DEVICE = os.environ["HW_DEVICE"] if "HW_DEVICE" in os.environ else None
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if "TEST_FILE_PATH" in os.environ:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
test_file_path = os.environ["TEST_FILE_PATH"]
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
fh = open(h264_path, "rb")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
pkg_config = os.environ.get("PKG_CONFIG", "pkg-config")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
huggingface_hub
python dependencyexpand_more 185 low-confidence finding(s)
with open(rel_path, "r") as fp:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
long_description=open("README.md", "r", encoding="utf-8").read(),
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.environ.get("EAGER_IMPORT", ""):
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(filter_file) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(plan_file, "w") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(plan_file) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(self.path_or_fileobj, "rb") as file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post(url, headers=headers, content=data, params=params)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
gitignore.write_text("*")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
tag_path.write_text(CACHEDIR_TAG_CONTENT)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.getenv("SPACE_ID") is not None:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
host = os.environ.get("SPACE_HOST")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.environ.get("GITHUB_ACTIONS") == "true":
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
request_url = os.environ.get("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
request_token = os.environ.get("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post(
f"{endpoint or constants.ENDPOINT}/oauth/token",
json={
"grant_type": _TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE,
"subject_token_type": _ID_TOKEN_TYPE,
"subject_token": subject_token,
"resource": resource,
},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
self._write_ranges(path, Path(local_path).read_bytes(), mode)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(local_path, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(local_path, "wb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(local_path, "wb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = self._client.request(method, self.base_url + path, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = self._client.get(self.base_url + "/health", timeout=httpx.Timeout(5.0))
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(ref_path) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(ref_path, "w") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(ref_path) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
_is_local = os.environ.get("SPACE_ID") is None
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
self.webhook_secret = webhook_secret or os.getenv("WEBHOOK_SECRET")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
self.fastapi_app.post(path)(func)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
space_host = os.environ.get("SPACE_HOST")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
formatter.write_text(line)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
extended_environ = os.environ.copy()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
env_map.update(load_dotenv(Path(env_file).read_text(), environ=extended_environ))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().get("https://formulae.brew.sh/api/formula/hf.json", timeout=2)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
return Path(os.environ.get("SHELL", "")).name or "bash"
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
path.write_text(_completion_script("fish"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
existing = path.read_text() if path.exists() else ""
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(tmp_path, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
(install_dir / "SKILL.md").write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
parsed = json.loads(local_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return body_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
data = json.loads(manifest_path.read_text())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
manifest_path.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if _COMPLETE_VAR not in os.environ:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(filepath, "rb") as file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
r = get_session().put(presigned_url, data=data)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
completion_url,
json={
"oid": oid,
"parts": parts,
},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
if command := os.getenv(env, "").strip():
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
_staging_mode = _is_true(os.environ.get("HUGGINGFACE_CO_STAGING"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
ENDPOINT = os.getenv("HF_ENDPOINT", _HF_DEFAULT_ENDPOINT).rstrip("/")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
INFERENCE_ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("HF_INFERENCE_ENDPOINT", "https://api-inference.huggingface.co")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
os.getenv(
"HF_HOME",
os.path.join(os.getenv("XDG_CACHE_HOME", default_home), "huggingface"),
)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
os.path.join(os.getenv("XDG_CACHE_HOME", default_home), "huggingface"),
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HUGGINGFACE_HUB_CACHE = os.getenv("HUGGINGFACE_HUB_CACHE", default_cache_path)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HUGGINGFACE_ASSETS_CACHE = os.getenv("HUGGINGFACE_ASSETS_CACHE", default_assets_cache_path)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
os.getenv(
"HF_HUB_CACHE",
HUGGINGFACE_HUB_CACHE,
)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
os.getenv(
"HF_ASSETS_CACHE",
HUGGINGFACE_ASSETS_CACHE,
)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_OFFLINE = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_OFFLINE") or os.environ.get("TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_UPDATE_CHECK = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_UPDATE_CHECK"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_DEBUG = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_DEBUG"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
_is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_TELEMETRY")) # HF-specific env variable
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
or _is_true(os.environ.get("DISABLE_TELEMETRY"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
or _is_true(os.environ.get("DO_NOT_TRACK")) # https://consoledonottrack.com/
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
os.getenv(
"HF_TOKEN_PATH",
os.path.join(HF_HOME, "token"),
)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
__HF_HUB_DISABLE_PROGRESS_BARS = os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_PROGRESS_BARS")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_SYMLINKS: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_SYMLINKS"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_SYMLINKS_WARNING: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_SYMLINKS_WARNING"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_WARNING: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_WARNING"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_IMPLICIT_TOKEN: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_IMPLICIT_TOKEN"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_XET_HIGH_PERFORMANCE: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_XET_HIGH_PERFORMANCE"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_ENABLE_HF_TRANSFER")) and not HF_XET_HIGH_PERFORMANCE:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_ETAG_TIMEOUT: int = _as_int(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_ETAG_TIMEOUT")) or DEFAULT_ETAG_TIMEOUT
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT: int = _as_int(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT")) or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_USER_AGENT_ORIGIN: str | None = os.environ.get("HF_HUB_USER_AGENT_ORIGIN")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
OAUTH_CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET = os.environ.get("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
OAUTH_SCOPES = os.environ.get("OAUTH_SCOPES")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
OPENID_PROVIDER_URL = os.environ.get("OPENID_PROVIDER_URL")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
DEVICE_CODE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("HF_DEVICE_CODE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "26be6b09-91c5-47da-9861-d2d2bb7a7e36")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_XET_CACHE = os.getenv("HF_XET_CACHE", default_xet_cache_path)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
HF_HUB_DISABLE_XET: bool = _is_true(os.environ.get("HF_HUB_DISABLE_XET"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, "w") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if not ref_path.exists() or commit_hash != ref_path.read_text():
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
tmp_path.write_text(commit_hash)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(ref_path) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(paths.file_path, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(revision_file) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/{repo_type}s/{repo_id}/paths-info/{revision}",
data={
"paths": paths if isinstance(paths, list) else [paths],
"expand": expand,
},
headers=headers,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(url, headers=headers, json=payload)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(path, headers=headers, json=payload)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().request("DELETE", path, headers=headers, json=json)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(path, headers=headers, json=json)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
duplicate_url,
headers=headers,
json={"target": {"type": repo_type, "name": repo_id}, "files": list(batch)},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(index_file) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
resp = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/{repo_type}s/{repo_id}/discussions",
json={
"title": title.strip(),
"description": description,
"pullRequest": pull_request,
},
headers=headers,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
resp = get_session().post(path, headers=headers, json=body)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/secrets",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().request(
"DELETE",
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/secrets",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"key": key},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/variables",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().request(
"DELETE",
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/variables",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"key": key},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/hardware",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/sleeptime",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"seconds": sleep_time},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/pause", headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token)
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/dev-mode",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"enabled": True},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/dev-mode",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"enabled": False},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/restart", headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token), params=params
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/{api_prefix}/{from_id}/duplicate",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/storage",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().put(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/spaces/{repo_id}/volumes",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_ENDPOINTS_ENDPOINT}/endpoint/{namespace}",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_CATALOG_ENDPOINT}/deploy",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().put(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_ENDPOINTS_ENDPOINT}/endpoint/{namespace}/{name}",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_ENDPOINTS_ENDPOINT}/endpoint/{namespace}/{name}/pause",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_ENDPOINTS_ENDPOINT}/endpoint/{namespace}/{name}/resume",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.INFERENCE_ENDPOINTS_ENDPOINT}/endpoint/{namespace}/{name}/scale-to-zero",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/collections", headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token), json=payload
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/collections/{collection_slug}/items",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/{repo_type}s/{repo_id}/user-access-request/handle",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/{repo_type}s/{repo_id}/user-access-request/grant",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"user": user},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/settings/webhooks",
json=post_webhooks_json,
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/settings/webhooks/{webhook_id}",
json=update_json,
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/settings/webhooks/{webhook_id}/enable",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/api/settings/webhooks/{webhook_id}/disable",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
content=relpath_to_abspath["README.md"].read_text(encoding="utf8"),
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/validate-yaml",
json={"content": content, "repoType": repo_type},
headers=headers,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/jobs/{namespace}",
json=job_spec,
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/jobs/{namespace}/{job_id}/cancel",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().put(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/jobs/{namespace}/{job_id}/labels",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"labels": labels},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/scheduled-jobs/{namespace}",
json=input_json,
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/scheduled-jobs/{namespace}/{scheduled_job_id}/suspend",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/scheduled-jobs/{namespace}/{scheduled_job_id}/resume",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/scheduled-jobs/{namespace}/{scheduled_job_id}/run",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().put(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/scheduled-jobs/{namespace}/{scheduled_job_id}/labels",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json={"labels": labels},
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{self.endpoint}/api/buckets/{namespace}/{name}",
headers=self._build_hf_headers(token=token),
json=payload,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(path, headers=headers, json=json_payload)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(path, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(index_file_path) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
outfile = open(lpath, "wb")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
config_path.write_text(config_str)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(config_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return MimeBytes(content.read_bytes(), mime_type=mimetypes.guess_type(content)[0])
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = await client.post(
request_parameters.url,
json=request_parameters.json,
data=request_parameters.data,
headers=request_parameters.headers,
cookies=self.cookies,
timeout=self.timeout,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = await client.get(url, headers=build_hf_headers(token=self.token))
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = await client.get(url, headers=build_hf_headers(token=self.token))
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
final_value = os.getenv(env_variable_key, "")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
config: AgentConfig = json.loads(cfg_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
prompt = prompt_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")), None
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(inputs, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(inputs, "rb") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
poll_response = session.get(poll_url, headers=request_params.headers)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
image_response = session.get(image_url)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(self._source_path, "rb") as file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, "rb") as file:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(filepath, mode="w", newline="", encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post("https://huggingface.co/api/validate-yaml", json=body, headers=headers)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
tmp_path.write_text(str(self), encoding="utf-8")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
template_str = Path(template_path).read_text()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
template_str = Path(cls.default_template_path).read_text()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
content = Path(local_path).read_text()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(local_path, newline="", encoding="utf8") as readme:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(local_path, "w", newline="", encoding="utf8") as readme:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
index = json.loads(entries["model_index.json"].read_text())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return Path(content).read_bytes()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(os.path.join(save_directory, index_path), "w") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(index_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return _clean_token(os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN") or os.environ.get("HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN"))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return _clean_token(Path(constants.HF_TOKEN_PATH).read_text())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
resource = os.environ.get("HF_OIDC_RESOURCE")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
subject_token = os.environ.get("HF_OIDC_ID_TOKEN") or None
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.environ.get(var, "").strip() == harness_id:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if value := os.environ.get(var, "").strip().lower():
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
value = os.environ.get(var)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/oauth/device",
data={"client_id": constants.DEVICE_CODE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID},
timeout=constants.HF_HUB_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/oauth/token",
data={
"grant_type": _DEVICE_CODE_GRANT_TYPE,
"device_code": device_info["device_code"],
"client_id": constants.DEVICE_CODE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
},
timeout=constants.HF_HUB_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
response = get_session().post(
f"{constants.ENDPOINT}/oauth/token",
data={
"grant_type": _REFRESH_TOKEN_GRANT_TYPE,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
"client_id": constants.DEVICE_CODE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
},
# An explicit timeout is critical here: this runs inside `get_token()`, so a hung
# request would otherwise block every Hub call in the process.
timeout=constants.HF_HUB_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT,
)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
r = session.get(path, params=params, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
return os.environ.get("VERTEX_PRODUCT") == "COLAB_ENTERPRISE"
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.environ.get("NO_COLOR") or is_agent():
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return ref_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
return main_ref.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
env_level_str = os.getenv("HF_HUB_VERBOSITY", None)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if os.getenv("TQDM_POSITION") == "-1":
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
tokenizers
python dependencyexpand_more 12 low-confidence finding(s)
os.environ["RAYON_NUM_THREADS"] = str(num_threads)
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(args.file, "r") as fp:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
m.ParseFromString(open(filename, "rb").read())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(filename, "r") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(self._model, "r") as model_f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = get(args.model, allow_redirects=True)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(args.vocab_output_path, "w") as vocab_f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(args.merges_output_path, "w") as merges_f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(args.input_file, "r") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(args.input_file, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
m.ParseFromString(open(filename, "rb").read())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(css_filename) as f:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
tqdm
python dependencyexpand_more 20 low-confidence finding(s)
(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / 'tqdm' / 'completion.sh').write_text(
completion, encoding='utf-8')
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
README_rst = (src_dir / '.readme.rst').read_text("utf-8")
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
man = (src_dir / '.tqdm.1.md').read_text() + man
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
(src_dir.parent / 'README.rst').write_text(README_rst, encoding='utf-8')
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / 'snapcraft.yaml').write_text(
snap_yml.decode('utf-8') if hasattr(snap_yml, 'decode') else snap_yml, encoding='utf-8')
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
with open(md, buffering=1) as m:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = requests.get(eg_link, stream=True)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with open(eg_out, "wb") as fout:
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = requests.get(eg_link, stream=True)
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
open(eg_out, "wb"), "write",
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
response = urllib.urlopen(eg_link) # nosec
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
with tqdm.wrapattr(open(eg_out, "wb"), "write",
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if any(i == 'QT_API' or i.startswith('SPYDER') for i in os.environ):
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
dst.write_bytes(fi.read_bytes())
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
if getenv("TQDM_SLACK_TOKEN") and getenv("TQDM_SLACK_CHANNEL"):
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
elif getenv("TQDM_TELEGRAM_TOKEN") and getenv("TQDM_TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID"):
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
elif getenv("TQDM_DISCORD_TOKEN") and getenv("TQDM_DISCORD_CHANNEL_ID"):
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
req = self.session.post(
f'{self.API}/channels/{self.channel_id}/messages',
headers={'Authorization': f'Bot {self.token}', 'User-Agent': self.UA},
json={'content': f"`{self.text}`"})
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
req = self.session.post(
f'{self.API}{self.token}/sendMessage',
data={'text': f"`{self.text}`", 'chat_id': self.chat_id,
'parse_mode': 'MarkdownV2'})
Data is sent to a hardcoded external endpoint; review what leaves the process.
Fix: Verify the destination and that only non-sensitive data is sent; pin and audit the dependency.
(k[i:].lower(), v) for k, v in os.environ.items() if k.startswith(prefix))
Reads environment variables or the filesystem — an inventory-level capability, not a leak on its own.
Fix: Usually benign; confirm any secret read here is not later sent externally.
Skipped dependencies
Production
- ctranslate2 prod — no sdist (wheels only)
- onnxruntime prod — no sdist (wheels only)